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1. INTRODUCTION 
From the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s New Zealand actively pursued a policy of 
deregulation and economic reform that in many instances resulted in commercial laws 
and regulations different from those of its major trading partners.  More recently, New 
Zealand’s policy independence has been questioned on the grounds that:  
(i) It is unlikely that such a small country can consistently produce or bear the 
cost of producing “better” laws and regulations than larger countries.   
(ii) Policy independence comes at high cost. In particular, regulatory and legal 
independence may reduce investment in New Zealand and slow the 
international expansion of New Zealand firms.   
(iii) The retention of laws and regulations that are distinctive from those in 
Australia may provide a barrier to New Zealand firms obtaining the full 
benefits of CER and unimpeded access to Australian markets.  
Proponents of harmonisation suggest that it is likely to result in more firms locating in 
New Zealand and in New Zealand firms expanding more rapidly.  Superior growth 
prospects for New Zealand firms flow from the fact that their cost of capital will be lower 
because investors will be more willing to invest in them when they operate within a 
familiar framework of commercial regulation and overseas expansion will be easier 
because they will already comply with international standards of commercial regulation.  
Following the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the New Zealand 
and Australian governments, harmonisation of New Zealand’s commercial law and 
regulation with that in Australia has become a primary rationale for the revision of 
commercial legislation.    
This paper provides an economic assessment of the costs and benefits of harmonising 
New Zealand’s commercial laws and regulations with those in Australia or with an 
OECD norm.1  It argues that unless the definition of harmonisation is limited to mutual 
recognition the economics literature surveyed does not support a general presumption in 
favour of harmonisation of commercial laws.  
The absence of any presumption in favour of harmonisation is based on the infeasibility 
of full harmonisation while New Zealand maintains political independence, and on the 
overall requirement for an assessment of the efficiency of any law in the context of the 
New Zealand economy.   
                                                 
1 Commercial regulation is interpreted as meaning all legislation and regulations bearing directly on the 
creation of commercial entities including their ability to raise new capital or transfer existing ownership 
rights, operate in markets, enter into transactions, enforce contracts relating to transactions, protect physical 
and intellectual property rights, and be wound up in the event of insolvency. 
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So long as New Zealand has independent courts and regulators the adoption of identical 
laws will not guarantee that the same words in legislation or the same regulatory structure 
will result in identical interpretations of decisions.  Thus, harmonisation of laws and 
regulations cannot remove from investors many of the costs of understanding unique 
features of the commercial environment in New Zealand.  
The design of commercial law and regulation should focus first and foremost on ensuring 
that the legal and regulatory framework is conducive to maximising the long-term growth 
of all commercial entities in New Zealand. In this framework, the benefits that would 
arise from harmonisation represent only one of the factors that would be considered in the 
reform of legislation.  Thus, whether the optimal legislation for New Zealand is unique, 
incorporates elements of regimes from other countries, or is exactly the framework of 
other countries, is at best a secondary issue. 
The paper concludes that the focus of debate about commercial regulation in New 
Zealand should be on the efficiency of legal and regulatory frameworks in promoting 
commercial activity in New Zealand. There should be no presumption that the benefits 
from harmonisation per se will be large enough to drive the adoption of legal and 
regulatory frameworks from overseas.  Any case for the adoption of legal and regulatory 
frameworks from overseas must therefore be made on the basis of the superior efficiency 
of the foreign approach when it is applied to firms operating in New Zealand.  
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2 THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF REGULATORY 
HARMONISATION 
2.1 WHAT IS REGULATORY HARMONISATION? 
The literature defines harmonisation as either “making the regulatory requirements or 
government policies of different jurisdictions identical, or at least similar” (Leebron 
1996) or as a broader spectrum of possible co-ordination between regulators in different 
countries.  In our view, the essence of harmonisation is that it involves some degree of 
regulatory co-ordination between two or more regulatory jurisdictions, which allows the 
laws of those countries to work together to some degree.  Thus, our definition of 
harmonisation does not necessarily entail two or more countries adopting identical or 
even similar laws.   
There is a spectrum of regulatory co-ordination ranging from co-operation between 
legislators and regulators designed to ensure clarity of jurisdiction and plug loopholes 
relating for firms operating in both jurisdictions to the adoption of identical laws and a 
single multi-state enforcement mechanism (regulator and courts) so that complete 
uniformity is achieved.  In the latter case harmonisation effectively provides for the 
integration of the markets of two or more economies.  In the middle of the spectrum are 
approaches designed to provide for reciprocity or mutual recognition, sometimes based 
on minimum standards.  
 
Spectrum of regulatory harmonisation 
Co-operation Reciprocity    Minimum Standards    Commonality     Integrated markets 
 
The degree or level of harmonisation pursued between regulatory jurisdictions will be 
dependent upon a number of factors including, the particular laws under consideration, 
the strength of economic connection between the jurisdictions, the likeness of current 
regulatory policy and objectives, the desired degree of local flexibility, the similarities 
and differences in the scale and institutional structures of the two economies, and the 
perceived benefits from harmonisation.   
The literature on harmonization often focuses on aspects of reciprocity (in the New 
Zealand context see Goddard 1999 for example).  Reciprocity can provide for mutual 
recognition regimes (where firms complying with the legal and regulatory regimes in one 
country are deemed to comply with those in the second country) and for jurisdictional 
agreements that allow firms to operate with one regulator and one set of rules for their 
activities whatever jurisdiction they operate in.  It is readily apparent, however, that 
mutual recognition and single jurisdiction agreements are most easily negotiated where 
the laws and regulations of the different jurisdictions are very similar, where the countries 
have a substantial economic interaction and where there is already some similarity in 
legal regimes, for example, both meeting some minimum standard (Geiger 1998). Thus, 
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reciprocity often leads to consideration of common minimum standards and may require 
stronger forms of harmonization such as the adoption of identical legislation or regulatory 
frameworks.     
2.2 POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM REGULATORY HARMONISATION 
The key benefits of harmonisation are normally claimed to arise from its ability to reduce 
transaction and compliance costs for firms operating or selling in multiple jurisdictions as 
well as providing benefits associated with joint production of regulatory products. 
Regulatory harmonisation across countries (whether through reciprocal arrangements, 
minimum standards or commonality) reduces the transactions/compliance costs 
associated with doing business across multiple jurisdictions.  For businesses, having to 
comply with multiple sets of regulation across jurisdictions adds to the cost of conducting 
business across borders.  This may discourage multiple market participation, reducing 
competition and social welfare.  For other market participants, harmonised standards 
reduce the need to gather and analyse information about different regulatory standards 
across jurisdictions.  Overall, harmonisation efforts act to reduce regulatory barriers to 
cross-country commerce.  Where New Zealand’s laws and regulations are harmonised 
with those of its major trading partners this may encourage the location of multinational 
firms in New Zealand and the retention of New Zealand firms that develop multinational 
operations. 
Where regulatory policy is independently determined within each jurisdiction, there is the 
potential for negative and/or positive external effects to be imposed on other regulatory 
jurisdictions.  Under these circumstances, some form of cooperation may be desirable to 
ensure that regulation is produced at the efficient level, not only within, but, across 
jurisdictions.  A commonly used example is intellectual property protection in one 
jurisdiction conferring positive benefits on other regulatory jurisdictions, through 
increasing the returns from research and development activity.  In the absence of 
coordination, the level of regulation may be set at sub-optimal levels. 
Economies of scale and scope may be derived from joint production of regulatory policy 
such that it is more efficient for a single (coordinated) regulator to produce regulatory 
policy across multiple jurisdictions.  That is, subsets of the market for regulatory policy 
may be characterised as a ‘natural monopoly’ where, given the level of demand, the 
market is more efficiently supplied by a single producer.  In areas where regulatory 
policy making is characterised by high fixed costs, for example, the cost of setting up a 
market regulator, there may be significant benefits from coordination as the fixed costs of 
regulatory policy making are spread across a wider market, reducing regulatory cost per 
head of population. Shah and Thomas (2001) find that there are significant increasing 
returns to scale in securities regulation and market infrastructure.  This issue is 
particularly relevant for smaller economies/markets where regulatory costs must be 
absorbed by a relatively small number of market participants. 
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Even for the aspects of regulatory policy making that are not characterised by economies 
of scale, sharing otherwise duplicated efforts can result in regulatory cost savings. 
Goddard (1999) identifies significant ‘network effects’ from harmonisation of substantive 
legal rules across jurisdictions.  Where two or more jurisdictions apply the same 
substantive law, each jurisdiction benefits from the interpretation and application of those 
rules to cases in the other jurisdiction.  As more jurisdictions adopt the same substantive 
laws, the potential for cross-border learning and knowledge sharing increases 
commensurately. 
2.3 HOW WIDELY SPREAD ARE THE BENEFITS OF HARMONISATION? 
Any case for regulatory harmonisation must rest on an analysis that demonstrates that the 
costs of harmonisation are clearly outweighed by the benefits.  The costs associated with 
regulatory harmonisation (associated with both the introduction of new legislation and the 
requirement for ongoing changes to maintain the desired degree of harmonisation ) will 
be dependent to a large extent on the degree of harmonisation/co-ordination pursued (in 
market and regulatory structures, laws and law enforcement). For example, mutual 
recognition, due to the absence of need to actually change domestic laws, is relatively 
simple and less costly to implement.2  Moving further along the harmonisation spectrum, 
establishing minimum standards, or identical laws will impose progressively higher 
coordination costs.  Importantly, these costs are imposed on all firms in the economy, 
because all firms will be required to comply with the harmonised legislation or 
regulations.  In weighing up the net costs and benefits it is therefore necessary to consider 
whether the benefits of harmonisation will be as widely spread. 
In any economy, the proportion of firms who operate in more than one jurisdiction will 
be small.  In OECD countries such as New Zealand, Australia and the UK, at any time 80 
- 85 percent of the commercial enterprises are small business whose operations are 
confined to the country of origin (though they may of course export goods and services 
without establishing a presence in other countries).  Broad harmonisation initiatives may 
require these firms to bear substantial costs associated with higher legislative and 
regulatory requirements even though their present operations do not allow them to obtain 
any of the benefits of the resulting ability to operate in other jurisdictions.   
Firms who do wish to operate in more than one jurisdiction will have to bear the costs of 
complying with whatever regulations and statues are relevant, but there may be 
substantial savings for these firms if they can operate in a regime that has lower 
compliance costs until such time as they wish to expand beyond their home jurisdiction.  
In this sense there may be a trade-off between short-term and long-term gains from 
harmonisation.  Harmonisation may provide short-term gains associated with the 
reduction in transaction and compliance costs for firms who operate in more than one 
jurisdiction.  However, there may be long-term costs for the economy resulting from the 
imposition of higher transaction and compliance costs on all firms in the economy.  
Higher transaction and compliance costs may slow the growth of those firms who are yet 
                                                 
2  Some change in domestic laws is often required in order for participating jurisdictions to be a party to mutual 
recognition arrangements. 
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to achieve the level of competitive advantage necessary to consider operating in another 
country, and thus slow the long-term rate of growth of the economy as a whole. 
Mutual recognition or reciprocity is the minimum degree of harmonisation required to 
facilitate lower cost access to Australian markets.  Overall, the costs associated with a 
system of mutual recognition are much lower than for those forms of harmonisation 
where law changes are necessary (e.g. adoption of common minimum standards or 
identical laws).   
A system of mutual recognition will, however, only be achievable where the laws of the 
participating jurisdictions fall with the tolerance limits for differences in regulatory 
standards in each jurisdiction.  In practice the process of harmonisation is likely to 
involve considerable real resource costs in agreeing to and effecting minimum standards, 
and in the imposition of those standards on firms that are not in a position to take 
advantage of the benefits that the common standards claim to provide.  Thus, regulatory 
harmonisation to attract firms with substantial operations in Australia comes at 
considerable cost and may not provide net benefits to the New Zealand economy. 
2.4 DOES ‘ONE SIZE FIT’ ALL IN REGULATION? 
A common criticism of harmonisation is that it will never lead to efficient outcomes as 
each country has different endowments and preferences (Goddard 1999) as reflected in 
each countries unique mix of domestic institutions, political circumstances, and position 
in the global economy (Guillen 1999).3  This high degree of diversity is evident across 
countries and is reflected in a wide breadth of factors including firm financing, 
ownership, and production decisions. According to this view, efforts to harmonise 
regulation across jurisdictions may result in harmonised, but inefficient standards, 
reducing social welfare.  A non-harmonised, but efficient standard should be preferred to 
a harmonised inefficient standard (Geiger 1998).  There is therefore considerable doubt 
that a ‘one size fits all’ approach to regulatory policy across countries is appropriate. 
Harmonisation may have costs for New Zealand if the optimal form of regulation 
depends on institutional features of the economy.  Arnold, Evans and Boles de Boer 
(2003) utilize Standard and Poors and ANZ data to compare markets and firms in New 
Zealand with those in Australia, the US, Sweden, the UK and the rest of the world.  They 
conclude that New Zealand’s 
1. Domestic markets are relatively concentrated; 
2. Industries and firms are capital intensive (relative to output);  
3. Firms have a higher real and nominal cost of capital; and 
4. Firms produce a relatively high operating margin but have 
significantly higher costs associated with relatively poor 
productivity and the absence of economies of scale. 
                                                 
3 This argument is most frequently raised in the specific literature on harmonisation of corporate governance laws 
across countries. 
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They conclude that regulatory approaches and laws from the larger OECD countries 
cannot be applied to New Zealand without significant risk of setting standards or 
imposing industry structures that are inefficient in the context of the small and isolated 
markets of New Zealand. 
Recognising this principle, international bodies (e.g. World Bank, OECD, IOSCO) have 
generally taken the approach of developing key regulatory principles or ‘minimum 
regulatory standards’ which recognise the value of divergent laws between countries.  For 
example, in the 1999 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (at pages 8 and 13), it 
is noted in the preamble that “[t]here is no single model of good corporate governance.  
Different legal systems, institutional frameworks and traditions mean that a range of 
different approaches have developed around the world.”  The objective of these 
Principles is to form a foundation for the development of legal and regulatory 
frameworks “…that reflect their [the country’s] own economic, social, legal and cultural 
circumstances…”. 
2.5 THE FEASIBILITY OF HARMONISATION  
Lloyd (1997) has argued that the feasibility of achieving harmonisation, defined as law 
and regulation which provides common outcomes in different jurisdictions, depends on 
the balance between quantitative and qualitative harmonisation.  Where there is only one 
object to be harmonized, for example, tariff levels or an acceptable level of polluting 
activity, harmonisation can be termed ‘quantitative’.  In contrast, where regulatory 
policies have multiple dimensions or elements, harmonisation will be qualitatively-based.  
Harmonisation of corporate laws is predominantly a qualitative process that cannot be 
portrayed on a line or continuum (Lloyd 1997: 10).  Where this is the case even slight 
differences in qualitative substance may lead to very different regulatory outcomes. 
Because so many elements of the law and institutional structure of society bear on the 
commercial sector, Lloyd argues that harmonisation will almost always be partial and 
minimum standards are the most achievable and most likely form of harmonisation.  The 
adoption of minimum standards in corporate law, which may be based on the current laws 
in either jurisdiction, or on model laws produced by international bodies such as the 
OECD or IOSCO, ensure that like principles and objectives are adopted, while giving 
individual regulators discretion with respect to legislative detail. 
The different functional levels of regulatory policy and law making – ranging from the 
formulation of regulatory objectives, drafting of legislative substance, administration, and 
enforcement – mean that harmonisation of substantive law will not necessarily produce 
identical regulatory outcomes across jurisdictions.  Even where harmonisation takes the 
form of adopting identical substantive laws, different approaches to interpretation by 
regulatory and legal institutions across countries may defeat the objectives of 
harmonisation.   
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An example is provided by harmonisation of competition law.  It is commonly said that 
the adoption by New Zealand of a substantially lessening of competition test for merger 
assessment in 2001 ‘brings New Zealand merger assessment in line with that of 
Australia’.  However, substantive law is only one input into the regulatory process and 
there is still considerable scope for different regulatory outcomes.  For example, the 
Commerce Commission’s Practice Notes that provide guidance to market participants on 
how the law will be interpreted and applied have not been harmonised with the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) equivalent guidelines (Merger 
Guidelines).  Similarly, actual enforcement by courts in each jurisdiction is expected to 
diverge based on differing market conditions.  Such differences in interpretation and 
application across jurisdictions can lead to very different regulatory outcomes despite the 
adoption of identical substantive laws. 
Evans and Hughes (2003) provide an example that illustrates why divergence in the 
interpretation of the same statutory terminology in Australia and New Zealand should be 
expected.  In a small economy, it is much more difficult for firms to achieve economies 
of scale in the domestic market.  This means that where economies of scale exist, mergers 
between relatively large domestic firms in the New Zealand market will have a stronger 
efficiency rationale than would an equivalent merger in a large economy where 
economies of scale had already been achieved. 
Harmonisation may be viewed as diluting the rights and influence of citizens to shape 
domestic policy.  Where the preferences of two or more countries must be accommodated 
in developing regulatory policy, the relative influence of domestic stakeholders may be 
lessened.  Coordination of regulatory policy and laws across countries will necessarily 
result in some degree of reduction in regulatory flexibility.  The need to coordinate policy 
responses to market changes across multiple jurisdictions may result in reduced policy 
responsiveness and less flexibility where some jurisdictions are relatively more affected 
or affected in different ways by market changes.   
The loss of flexibility is most obvious where differences in administration and 
enforcement are overcome by integrating regulatory and legal institutions across 
countries.  However, the loss of political autonomy associated with this approach and 
political sensitivities mean that it is a rarely pursued option, and is often viewed as being 
a radical policy proposal in comparison with substantive law harmonisation.   
Harmonisation may also dilute the accountability of local regulators and politicians for 
the laws that they pass and for their enforcement of them.  The ability of legislators and 
politicians to avoid accountability for unnecessarily costly legislation or regulation on the 
grounds that it is was required to maintain harmonisation represents a potentially very 
significant cost.  
  8
   
2.6 CORPORATE LAW HARMONISATION: SECURITIES REGULATION 
This section of the paper considers the relative magnitude of the potential benefits and 
costs of regulatory harmonisation of corporate laws between New Zealand and Australia, 
examining the specific case of securities regulation.4
One of the key economic benefits of regulatory harmonisation is a reduction in the costs 
of regulatory compliance for business when operating across multiple regulatory 
jurisdictions.  In relation to securities and disclosure regulation, harmonisation 
significantly reduces the costs to business associated with cross-listing on a foreign 
exchange. 
The costs associated with multinational offerings/cross-listing (including initial 
fundraising costs and ongoing disclosure obligations) can be substantial.  Geiger (1998) 
notes the results of various studies which find that disclosure costs are a key and often 
determining factor for management in pursuing cross-border listing.  The sensitivity of 
domestic companies to the compliance costs of cross-listing on a foreign exchange is 
demonstrated by the reaction of domestic companies to the recent tightening of foreign 
listing exemption thresholds on the ASX.  Box 1 provides an overview of the current 
ASX foreign listing exemption arrangements and the recent impact of increases in the 
thresholds on the cross-listing decision of New Zealand firms. 
 
Box 1: Moves away from regulatory harmonisation of securities law? 
Recent changes to foreign listing exemption on ASX – moves away from 
harmonisation? 
Cross-listing of New Zealand companies on the ASX has so far only been undertaken by 
some of the largest publicly listed companies (e.g. Telecom Corp, Carter Holt Harvey, 
and Sky Network Television).  This is largely due to the foreign exempt threshold which 
allows foreign companies having over $50m of assets and $200m in net profit being 
allowed to list on the ASX while being exempted from most of the ASX listing/disclosure 
rules provided they comply with home country laws.  Companies falling below this 
threshold must undertake a full listing, incurring significant compliance costs in addition 
to those incurred in their home country. 
In a recent move away from harmonisation, the ASX lifted the exemption threshold 
affecting a number of New Zealand companies that have since de-listed from the ASX, in 
preference to applying for full listing.  These companies either considered ASX full 
listing to be too costly, or did not meet the requirements for admission.  The decision to 
de-list in many cases demonstrates the importance of compliance costs in the decision to 
cross-list on foreign exchanges. 
                                                 
4 There are many areas of law which make up business law, including: contract law, sale of goods, property law, 
negotiable instruments, company law, competition law, intellectual property law, insolvency laws, and jurisdiction and 
administrative law (Goddard 1999). 
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The ASX stated that the motivation for increasing the threshold was to improve 
disclosure, with the exemption still applying for larger foreign companies which are 
generally subject to more scrutiny than smaller companies. 
 
Where securities laws are harmonised (whether through reciprocity or commonality), 
issuers of capital no longer need to incur the cost of complying with multiple sets of 
disclosure standards across countries.  Other things being equal, harmonisation is 
expected to lead to an increase in multijurisdictional offerings of securities. 
The potential benefits for domestic firms of cross-listing on larger, more liquid foreign 
exchanges are well documented in the literature, and include access to a larger investor 
base, a reduction in information asymmetries, enhanced stock liquidity, and lower cost of 
capital.  Table 1 compares the size of liquidity of the New Zealand (NZSE) and 
Australian stock market (ASX) at the end of 2001. 
Table 1: The size and liquidity of NZSE and ASX (end 2001) 
 NZSE ASX 
Market Size 
Total no. Co.s listed 195 1410 
Market capitalisation 
of domestic Co.s  
$42.5m $732.8m 
Market capitalisation 
to GDP 
35% 106% 
Market Liquidity 
Total Value Traded 
(local $) 
$20,435m $469,953m 
Value traded to GDP 17% 68% 
Value traded to 
market capitalisation 
48% 64% 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (2001) 
 
The ASX is significantly larger than the NZSE, not only in the absolute sense, but also 
relative to the size of the economy.  The ASX also experiences higher liquidity in listed 
stocks, having a larger aggregate value-traded and turnover ratio.5
                                                 
5  The value-traded ratio is equal to the total value of shares traded over the year divided by total GDP for the period.  
The turnover ratio is equal to the total value of shares traded divided by market capitalisation at year end. 
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Theoretical and empirical studies highlight stock market liquidity (as measured by the 
level of activity) as being an important driver of firm cost of capital and growth.6  The 
economic literature finds that a more active stock market is associated with lower firm 
cost of capital and from a macroeconomic perspective, higher current and future 
economic growth. 
Further, large capital markets (like that of Australia) provide economies of scale in 
monitoring and encouragement to active portfolio management that may not be feasible 
in a smaller and less diversified market, encouraging foreign investor participation.  A 
recent report on New Zealand’s stock market noted that “to some large overseas 
investors, the New Zealand market has become too small and illiquid to invest in with 
any great conviction…”7  Given the declining size of New Zealand’s stock market over 
the past decade, there is the real possibility that foreign demand for domestic equity 
securities will significantly decline as the fixed costs of information acquisition and 
market monitoring are spread over a relatively small portfolio.  Cross-listing on the ASX 
provides a vehicle for domestic companies to increase foreign participation in their 
capital issues, increasing stock liquidity, and lowering the cost of capital. 
Reducing the transactions costs of cross-listing on the larger and more liquid ASX 
through harmonisation would provide clear benefits to the largest New Zealand firms and 
could potentially lower their cost of capital.  Overall, harmonisation measures that 
facilitate lower cost listing on larger and more liquid foreign exchanges help to retain 
large New Zealand companies in New Zealand.  However, this analysis does not consider 
the costs that are imposed on all firms by the requirement to adopt harmonised 
regulations or laws.  There can certainly be no presumption that the net effect of adopting 
regulations or laws that facilitate cross-listing will promote the growth of New Zealand 
firms or the New Zealand economy as a whole.8
Encouraging capital inflow 
It is often claimed that harmonising New Zealand’s securities laws with those of 
Australia will reduce the barriers to foreign participation in the New Zealand market, 
encouraging capital inflow and benefiting New Zealand’s capital markets.  The argument 
is that harmonisation of New Zealand’s securities laws with those of Australia creates a 
familiar regulatory regime which may see foreign investors ‘bundle’ the two markets 
together for the purposes of portfolio monitoring and assessment, thereby increasing 
participation in New Zealand’s equity market.  Where securities laws are harmonised, 
foreign investors do not have to incur the costs of learning and assessing a separate New 
Zealand regulatory environment, for what is a relatively small part of their global 
portfolio (Goddard 2001). 
                                                 
6  See Amihud and Mendelson (1988), Bernstein (1987), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and Eleswarapu and 
Krishnamurti (1995). 
7   Euromoney (2002). 
8  For a critical analysis see Wilkinson (2003) . 
  11
   
Although some degree of regulatory harmonisation will contribute to reducing 
monitoring and transactions costs for foreign investors, the net impact on New Zealand 
capital markets is likely to be small.  Differences in regulation and the associated 
transactions costs of learning are unlikely to be a key determinant of foreign investor 
participation in New Zealand’s capital markets.  Other non-regulatory factors such as 
market efficiency, relative returns, agency problems, and ownership structures are much 
more influential than the extent of regulatory harmonisation with Australia.  So while 
regulatory harmonisation may reduce transactions costs for foreign investors, the actual 
impact on New Zealand’s capital markets is likely to be very small. 
More important for foreign investors is that regulations relating to New Zealand’s capital 
markets are consistent with and efficient in the context of the particular institutional 
features of capital markets in New Zealand.  This suggests that short of full integration of 
the New Zealand capital market into that of Australia, New Zealand may benefit from 
regulatory competition designed to create a regulatory environment that is efficient in the 
context of New Zealand capital markets rather than one that is efficient in the context of 
Australian capital markets.  
2.7 INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
The most notable efforts to harmonise corporate laws across countries has occurred in the 
European Union where most economic commentators consider that the experience raises 
doubts about both the feasibility and efficiency of harmonisation.  Other examples have 
occurred in North America between the US and Canada, two countries that, like New 
Zealand and Australia, have a very close economic connection. 
Callaghan (2000) summarises the difficulties encountered in the EU corporate law 
harmonisation process over several decades: 
The first formal legislative draft for a European Company Statute, presented by the 
European Commission after ten years of preparatory work, was rejected by the Council 
of Ministers in 1970.  Amended versions in 1975, 1989 and 1991 met with a similar fate.  
A highly diluted fifth draft was finally passed at the Nice summit last December; EU 
merger policy was deadlocked for almost fifteen years; the hostile takeover directive has 
been under debate for more than a decade with no compromise in sight; the prospectus 
directive has recently inspired calls for another sixty amendments.  In all cases, the 
harmonisation process was held up because national representatives in the Council of 
Ministers and/or the European Parliament refused to endorse legislative drafts presented 
by the European Commission. 
The European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, a group of academics and 
independent experts formed to analyse policy issues in financial regulation, released a 
statement in February 2002, emphasising the desirability of harmonising capital markets 
regulation across the EU.  In relation to corporate law harmonisation, however, they 
considered that “the determination of corporate law…should be left largely to the 
Member States, pursuant to the subsidiarity principle.”9
                                                 
9  European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2002). 
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The subsidiarity principle which has gained considerable momentum in the EU in recent 
years10, is “…intended to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the 
citizen and that constant checks are made as to whether action at Community level is 
justified in the light of the possibilities available at national, regional or local level.  
Specifically, it is the principle whereby the Union does not take action (except in the 
areas which fall within its exclusive competence) unless it is more effective than action 
taken at national, regional or local level. It is closely bound up with the principles of 
proportionality and necessity, which require that any action by the Union should not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty.”11
The Committee went on to state that, “[w]henever the EU has departed from this [the 
subsidiarity] principle in the area of corporate law, the results have either been 
inconsequential or harmful (for example, the imposition of a rigid and expensive regime 
of mandated capital in the Second Corporate Law Directive).  By now there is 
considerable evidence that it is preferable to allow corporate law to retain a fair amount 
of flexibility by leaving its structures to competition among Member States.” (emphasis 
added)12
Despite the recommendations of the Shadow Committee, further efforts towards 
corporate law harmonisation continue in the EU.  The Lamfalussy Report released in 
February 2001 contains a number of priorities for harmonisation of securities regulation 
in the EU.  Among the key priorities are: a single prospectus for issuers in the EU, 
adoption of international accounting standards, and a single passport for EU stock 
markets.  Further, the High Level Group of Company Law Experts recently released a 
report on Company Law Harmonisation in Europe highlighting key areas for 
harmonisation priority including corporate governance laws, capital formation, and 
company restructuring laws.13
In respect of Canada and the US, the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS) 
adopted in 1991 is based on reciprocity, rather than harmonisation, allowing Canadian 
and US issuers of securities to list in each other’s jurisdiction based on compliance with 
home country laws.  The rationale for the agreement was that “…filing standards in 
Canadian jurisdictions and the US were so similar that to file in both countries would 
have been a waste of time and money.”14  The MJDS has been described as a hybrid 
between commonality and reciprocity, with reciprocal agreement being dependent upon 
some degree of commonality or minimum standards. 
                                                 
10  The subsidiarity principle is incorporated into the EU Treaty. 
11  Europarl. 
12  European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2002). 
13  High Level Group of Company Law Experts (2002). 
14  CIBC Mellon (2000). 
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The MJDS has reduced the costs of access of Canadian firms to US capital by reducing 
the need for compliance with detailed documentation through the SEC.  Similar to the 
case of New Zealand and Australia, the agreement provides most benefit to Canadian 
firms that can access the larger and more liquid US capital markets at lower regulatory 
cost. 
In 2000 the SEC proposed to remove the MJDS exemption for Canadian issuers, claiming 
that it offered preferential treatment to Canadian issuers, over other foreign issuers.15  
However, many commentators suggested that the SEC may have been unsatisfied with 
the level of Canadian disclosure regulations.16
2.8 CO-OPETITION 
An intermediate position between regulatory competition and harmonization, termed 
‘regulatory co-opetition’, has been suggested by some authors.  They argue that some 
combination of regulatory competition and cooperation is almost always optimal 
regardless of the subject matter of regulation.  
According to Esty and Geradin (2000: 248) the co-opetition model recognizes that the 
regulatory process may benefit from some degree of coordination working in parallel 
with competitive forces.  Coordination may range from formal harmonisation on some 
matters through to simple exchanges of information and data and policy experience 
between regulators.  They cite varying justifications for cooperation including the 
benefits of resource sharing and expertise to the need for coordination on issues such as 
antitrust assessment of cross-border mergers.  They conclude that “it is very much the 
exceptional case…where cooperation should proceed to the point of complete 
harmonisation or ‘homogenization’ of regulatory policies across all jurisdictions”. 
2.9 SUMMARY 
Contrary to views commonly expressed in the policy literature, there is no general 
presumption in the wider economics literature in favour of or against harmonisation 
(Lloyd et al 2001).17  This is particularly true in respect of harmonisation of commercial 
laws; here harmonisation has intellectual appeal but may also impose substantial costs 
(Duffy 2002).  
Even where there are market imperfections that justify government intervention, or where 
the costs of some firms can be reduced by harmonization, it must be demonstrated that 
the long-run benefits of harmonisation outweigh the long-run costs for all commercial 
enterprises in the economy.  Any form of government intervention is costly in terms of 
                                                 
15  Ibid. 
16  Ibid. 
17  It is very common to see broad statements in policy papers that assume that the argument for harmonisation is so 
straightforward and intuitive that it need not be made out.  For example, “It seems generally accepted that CER 
reforms, including the removal of regulatory inconsistencies between Australia and New Zealand is beneficial.” (Speir 
Consulting (2002)).  Similarly, in the 2001 Lamfalussy Report, significant economic benefits are claimed on one hand, 
while, on the other hand, it is recommended that a quantitative study be carried out to assess the economic impact of 
legal harmonisation and market integration. 
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initial costs of effecting coordination, potential transition costs, and any ongoing costs of 
harmonisation.  Further, harmonisation is just one form of intervention where there are 
barriers to effective regulatory competition.  Other forms of welfare-enhancing 
intervention may include specifically targeting the sources of market imperfections, for 
example, by reducing barriers to mobility, or increasing the availability of information. 
In many cases there will be a tradeoff between the benefits of regulatory competition and 
harmonisation.  Where this is the case, the short-term advantages of harmonisation should 
be weighed against the long-term benefits of sustained regulatory competition (Niemeyer 
(2001)).  In particular, it would not be efficient for New Zealand to impose on all its 
commercial enterprises costs that need be borne only by firms who wish to operate in 
multiple jurisdictions because such a policy is likely to produce short-term gains for the 
most successful firms but long-run net costs for the vast majority of firms in the 
economy. 
Regulatory harmonisation of securities laws between Australia and New Zealand would 
provide benefits to the largest New Zealand companies through a reduction in the costs of 
participating in the larger, more liquid, Australian capital markets.  Participation in 
Australian markets can deliver increased stock liquidity and potentially lower the cost of 
capital for domestic firms. 
In terms of the impact on New Zealand’s capital markets, harmonisation would result in 
some reduction in transactions costs faced by foreign investors.  However:  
1. Small differences in law and regulation across countries are unlikely to be a 
key determinant of foreign investor participation in New Zealand’s capital 
markets.  Other non-regulatory factors such as market efficiency, relative 
returns, agency problems, and ownership structures are likely to be more 
important determinants of foreign participation; and 
2. Small differences in the interpretation of law and regulation are likely to 
impose substantial transactions costs associated with understanding local 
markets thus mitigating any benefits from the harmonisation of laws.   
Our analysis suggests that there is substantial scope for effective competition in securities 
regulation between Australia and New Zealand.  There is a high degree of mobility for 
business and citizens between the two jurisdictions, both countries compete for foreign 
investment in the development of the local economy, and recent efforts at unilateral 
coordination suggest that some competitive process is currently at work.  The regulatory 
environment does have an impact on the expected returns available to investors and can 
thus have a significant impact on new investment in an economy.  In respect of attracting 
foreign investment and retaining the investment capital of New Zealand residents, 
regulatory competition aimed at providing in New Zealand the most efficient regime of 
capital market regulation is likely to provide the greatest benefit to New Zealand. 
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 3 REGULATORY COMPETITION  
3.1 THE THEORY OF REGULATORY COMPETITION   
The theory of regulatory competition views regulation (including policy design, 
legislation, administration, and enforcement) as a ‘product’ best produced in a 
competitive global market.  That is, in the same way that it is accepted that competition 
promotes welfare-maximising outcomes in conventional product markets, competition in 
regulatory policy and law making produces efficient and superior regulatory regimes 
(Romano 2001).  Esty and Geradin (2000) summarise the argument for regulatory 
competition as follows: 
Competitive pressures…force governments to produce their regulatory products at 
competitive ‘prices’ (so that the benefits of government intervention exceed the costs) on 
the pain of losing their customers, in this case citizens or businesses.  The normative 
strength of the theory lies in the hope that competition will stimulate experimentation, 
innovation, and product differentiation in regulation, as in markets for products.  The 
process of refining the product (regulatory requirements and approaches) to meet 
consumer (societal) desires thus leads to the adoption of more efficient laws and 
enhances social welfare… 
…For regulatory competition theorists, centralized systems of standard setting 
[harmonisation] should be seen as regulatory cartels which, like any form of collusion 
between competitors, inhibit the operation of the market, raise prices, and reduce 
economic efficiency. 
Further, the theory predicts that regulatory competition can act to eliminate inefficient 
rent-seeking behaviour and make regulators less susceptible to capture. 
The proponents of regulatory competition therefore argue that governments should 
operate autonomously in developing regulatory policy.  Just as in other product markets, 
in the absence of market failure, competition among the different regulatory jurisdictions 
will stimulate regulatory innovation, economic efficiency and convergence to the 
‘competitive equilibrium’.  Thus, regulatory competition does not rule out convergence in 
the legal and regulatory regimes implemented in different jurisdictions, but it does imply 
that the process driving convergence is different from that associated with a policy of 
harmonisation.  Regulatory competition leads to convergence because the competitive 
process drives the identification of the most efficient laws and regulations, and provides 
each jurisdiction with incentives to adopt them. The competitive process actually 
determines the substance and form of optimal regulatory policy and in the absence of 
regulatory competition, the optimal policy will be unknown (Sykes 2000). 
Ongoing heterogeneity would only be observed where differences in the commercial 
environments made different laws and regulations efficient in each jurisdiction. 
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3.2 RELEVANCE TO NEW ZEALAND 
The literature on regulatory competition focuses on the situation in which states operating 
within a framework of mutual recognition (such as that established within a federal 
system) compete to attract capital on the basis of the efficiency of the regulatory 
environment that they create.  The most frequently-discussed example relates to the 
requirements for incorporation within the US: the costs of incorporation vary across 
states but incorporation confers the right to operate throughout the US.  Similar examples 
may now be cited in relation to the European Union. 
This approach to regulatory competition has limited applicability to New Zealand.  New 
Zealand’s high degree of political independence from even its closest trading partner 
(Australia) and its geographical isolation mean that the scope for competition is limited.  
Even if New Zealand had a comprehensive mutual recognition regime covering all 
aspects of commercial regulation in place with Australia, there is limited scope for New 
Zealand to compete with Sydney and Melbourne for the location of head offices (just as, 
within New Zealand, Dunedin is no longer a feasible location for the head office of firms 
whose primary market is in Auckland).  This is because the costs of being at a distance 
from the largest markets and from the managers of the operating divisions of the firm 
outweigh any of the benefits associated with more efficient regulation.  New Zealand is 
not in competition with Australia to attract firms wanting to supply the Australian market: 
they will certainly find the costs and risks of operating from New Zealand to be too high, 
no-matter how efficient is New Zealand’s commercial regulation.    
The concept of regulatory competition has greater relevance to New Zealand when the 
competition is viewed as being that required to attract and retain the investment and 
labour that is required to maximize economic growth in New Zealand.  New Zealand 
competes for internationally mobile capital and labour that will be applied to activities 
based in New Zealand and may attract more of both factors of production the more 
efficient is its commercial regulation.  While commercial regulation may not be the pre-
eminent factor in a business investment decision it may have a significant impact on the 
expected return from the investment and thus on the aggregate amount of investment in 
the economy.  Thus, the closer are New Zealand’s commercial laws and regulations to 
those that are optimal in the context of the New Zealand economy, the faster will be the 
growth of firms located in New Zealand.  This approach suggests that in the consideration 
of the adoption of Australian laws, the efficiency of those laws in the context of the New 
Zealand economy should take precedence over any views about the merits of 
harmonisation per se.    
3.3 LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE FOR REGULATORY COMPETITION  
The scope for regulatory competition to produce efficient outcomes may be limited by a 
range of costs or market imperfections.18  The principal costs and imperfections 
considered in the literature are discussed below.  
                                                 
18 Some of the literature refers to these costs and market imperfections as “market failure”, but this terminology is 
inconsistent with the usual definition of market failure found in the public economics literature.  
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Externalities 
The regulatory standards of one country may impose negative (or positive) externalities 
on another economy leading to over-production (or under-production) of regulatory 
standards relative to the social optimum.  A commonly noted example of a negative 
externality is the argument that weak intellectual property laws may also impose external 
costs by reducing the level of innovation and dynamic efficiency in other jurisdictions 
(Esty and Geradin 2000). However, the literature suggests that competition in corporate 
charter rules does not have significant spillovers and is likely to be welfare-enhancing 
(Esty and Geradin 2000). A positive externality arises from the fact that regulators in 
different jurisdictions may adopt in part or as a whole the legislation or regulations of 
other countries where they consider it advantageous to do this.  This of course implies 
that unless developments are left up to international regulatory bodies, all legal 
jurisdictions benefit from the willingness and ability of individual countries to develop 
and adopt law and regulation that differs from that in their trading partners. 
Information 
The efficient allocation of resources in a competitive market requires that market 
participants possess full and perfect information, allowing them to choose between 
competing suppliers.  It follows that for regulatory competition to produce efficient 
outcomes, businesses and citizens need to be fully informed about the costs and benefits 
of alternative regulatory regimes across multiple jurisdictions. 
There are significant costs associated with acquiring and analysing this type of 
information across multiple countries.  Further, such costs need to be incurred on an 
ongoing basis as laws change and evolve in response to market pressures.  There may 
also be some degree of uncertainty as to the actual operation and application of laws in 
foreign jurisdictions.  These factors potentially inhibit the efficient operation of 
regulatory competition. 
Lack of information and comparability of regulatory jurisdictions may lead to a market 
for lemons (Geiger 1998).  Where market participants are unable to fully distinguish 
between efficient and inefficient jurisdictions, they may end up choosing the jurisdiction 
imposing lowest compliance costs, regardless of the efficiency or effectiveness of 
regulation.  In the extreme it is frequently argues that information problems may generate 
a ‘race to the bottom’.  The argument is that as jurisdictions compete for business as part 
of the competitive process, competing regulators will be tempted to reduce standards to 
attract more business.  Under this view, rather than producing welfare-maximising 
competition, regulatory competition may lead to inefficient standards, reducing social 
welfare.   
Arguments relating to information primarily have force where there are negative 
externalities for other jurisdictions so that the home jurisdiction does not bear all of the 
costs of the low standards.  Absent these externalities we would expect the cost of low-
quality regulation to be fully internalized in the decisions made in each jurisdiction.  In 
addition, the arguments have little force where the type of regulatory competition being 
considered is that associated with policy-makers selecting the optimal environment for 
the growth of local business, since policy-makers have the resources and the incentives to 
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invest in acquisition of information about the long-term costs and benefits of alternative 
legal and regulatory regimes. 
Mobility of Resources 
The theory of regulatory competition within federal systems is dependent upon the free 
movement of market participants between regulatory jurisdictions in order to exert 
competitive discipline on regulators – that is, businesses and citizens being able to “vote 
with their feet” (Esty and Geradin 2000).  This characterization of regulatory competition 
relies very much on the example of competition for state-level incorporation where the 
location of the incorporation has no important implications for the location of the firm’s 
activities within the different states that make up the federal system.  The example is of 
limited relevance to regulatory competition between New Zealand and Australia because, 
short of comprehensive mutual recognition regimes, incorporation in New Zealand would 
not allow avoidance of Australian regulations.  Moreover, even if incorporation in New 
Zealand did provide full powers to operate in Australia, New Zealand incorporation 
brings with it the requirement to maintain head office functions in New Zealand and thus 
separate from the primary operational activities of the firm. 
Market Power 
Some regulatory jurisdictions may possess market power derived from some non-
regulatory advantage over competing jurisdictions (Geiger 1998).  For example, in 
relation to securities regulation, countries with larger and more liquid capital markets 
may be able to impose more costly, less efficient regulation while still attracting firms 
from competing jurisdictions with more efficient regulation but smaller and less liquid 
capital markets. 
3.4 SUMMARY 
There is a substantial body of academic thinking on regulatory structure which suggests 
that the presumption should be in favour of regulatory competition and that 
harmonization should be considered only where market imperfections “…prevent the 
creation of the competitive equilibrium” (Geiger 1998). The theory of regulatory 
competition and critiques of it have, however, developed in relation to environments 
where political integration provides for mutual recognition, and economic integration is 
so complete as to ensure that regulatory competition can be effective in influencing the 
geographical investment and resource allocation decisions of firms.  This clearly is not 
the case for New Zealand. 
For New Zealand the key lesson from the regulatory competition literature lies in the 
view that cross-country heterogeneity in law and regulation may be efficient.  This is 
because it provides New Zealand with the scope to implement the most efficient 
environment within which to operate and promote the growth of firms in New Zealand.  
From this perspective, regulatory competition focuses attention on the need to ensure first 
and foremost that the legal and regulatory framework is conducive to maximizing the 
long-term growth of all commercial entities in New Zealand.  Whether this is a 
framework that is unique, incorporates elements of regimes from other countries, or is 
exactly the framework of other countries, is at best a secondary issue.   
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
Our analysis suggests that while the costs and benefits of harmonisation of commercial 
regulation vary with the specific approach that is adopted, the costs of harmonisation will 
often outweigh the benefits.  Specifically: 
(i) All harmonisation initiatives impose some costs on society.   
(ii) Where mutual recognition agreements can be negotiated, these will lower the 
transactions costs associated with trade and multinational investment.  The 
costs of mutual recognition per se are not high (if legislative change is not 
required and no additional compliance costs are imposed).  However, there 
will only be clear net benefits from mutual recognition if that regime leaves 
New Zealand free to adopt laws and regulatory frameworks that maximize the 
long-term growth of all firms in New Zealand.  The freedom to adopt 
regulation and law that is optimal in the context of New Zealand firms and 
markets - “regulatory competition” - is likely to provide substantial benefits to 
the New Zealand economy.  
(iii) Harmonisation of laws may provide benefits to those firms who operate in 
more than one jurisdiction, but may impose higher transaction and compliance 
costs on the vast majority of firms who operate only in the domestic market.  
Harmonisation may also make New Zealand investment opportunities less 
attractive to foreign and domestic investors by creating a regulatory or legal 
regime that is inefficient given the unique features of New Zealand’s 
economy. Thus, harmonization may provide short-term gains but may, in the 
long-term, slow the growth of domestic firms and of the economy as a whole. 
(iv) Harmonisation of laws may provide the benefits of a wider body of precedent 
and interpretation from multiple jurisdictions.  If, however, local interpretation 
of laws and regulations is required precedents and interpretations from other 
jurisdictions will be of more limited value, and the transactions costs imposed 
by the need to understand unique elements of the legal and regulatory regime 
in each country are unlikely to be reduced to any significant extent.  Our view 
is therefore that unless the adoption of harmonised laws is accompanied by the 
adoption of a single legal and regulatory framework for enforcement, net 
social benefits from harmonisation are unlikely even in the most optimistic 
scenarios.  
Mutual recognition is consistent with regulatory competition in that it provides the scope 
for New Zealand and Australia to compete through improvements to their commercial 
laws within the tolerance limits set by the minimum requirements for mutual recognition.  
However, the literature on competition within a framework provided by mutual 
recognition has been developed in political contexts unlike that applying to New Zealand.  
For New Zealand mutual recognition may require substantial harmonization and rule out 
significant independence in law and regulation, which means that the costs and benefits 
of the adoption of laws from other jurisdictions will usually need to be considered. 
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In the context of securities markets, there is evidence that harmonisation of laws and 
enforcement at the level of the creation of a single market does provide benefits in terms 
of lower costs for investors and a lower cost of capital for firms.  There is, however, no 
clear evidence that would lead us to expect that harmonisation of laws with Australia will 
reduce the cost of capital in New Zealand.  So long as commercial laws are interpreted by 
New Zealand regulators, enforced by New Zealand courts and subject to change through 
political processes in New Zealand, then investors in firms domiciled in New Zealand 
will still have to invest in understanding the local environment rather than simply 
utilizing their knowledge of Australia. 
New Zealand’s current policy on harmonisation appears to place too little weight on the 
importance of regulatory competition for the attraction and retention of investment in 
New Zealand.  New Zealand will benefit most from regulatory competition designed to 
create a regulatory and legal environment that is efficient in the context of New Zealand 
markets and this may not always be identical to that adopted in Australian markets.   
Overall this analysis suggests that the focus of debate about commercial regulation in 
New Zealand should continue to be on the long-run efficiency of legal and regulatory 
frameworks in promoting commercial activity in New Zealand.  In many cases the 
benefits from harmonisation per se will not be large enough to drive the adoption of legal 
and regulatory frameworks from overseas.  New Zealand may wish to adopt Australian 
laws where they are considered to be superior to those in New Zealand.  However, this 
should primarily be a matter of superiority, not a matter of harmonisation.  Any case for 
the adoption of legal and regulatory frameworks from overseas should therefore be made 
on the basis of the superior efficiency of the foreign approach when it is applied to firms 
operating in New Zealand.  
 
  21
   
5 REFERENCES 
 
Amihud, Y. and H. Mendelson (1986) “Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread”, Journal 
of Financial Economics, December, 223-249. 
Arnold, T, Boles de Boer, D and Evans, L (2003) “The Structure of New Zealand 
Industry: Its Implications for Competition Law” (Wellington, NZISCR). 
Bernstein (1997) “Liquidity, Stock Markets, and Market Makers” Financial 
Management, 16, 54-62. 
Callaghan, Helen (2002) “Corporate law harmonisation in the European Union – what 
makes it so difficult?” Transatlantic Graduate Student Workshop for Advanced Ph.D. 
Students on EU Politics, 7-8 June 2002, Sala Europa, Villa Schifanoia, EUI. 
CIBC Mellon (2000) “The End of the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System”, Inform, 
March. 
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli and Vojislav Maksimovic (1998) “Law, Finance, and Firm 
Growth”, Journal of Finance, Vol LIII, No. 6, December. 
Duffy, John F. (2002) “Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law”, Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal. 
Eleswarapu, V. and C. Krishnamurti (1995) “Liquidity, Stock Returns, and Ownership 
Structure: an empirical study of the Bombay Stock Exchange”, WUSTL Economics 
Working Paper 9507005. 
Esty, Daniel C. and Damien Geradin (2000) “Regulatory Co-opetition” Journal of 
International Economic Law, 235-255. 
Euromoney (2002) “The Euromoney Guide to World Capital Markets 2002”. 
European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2002) “Re-Plumbing European 
Securities Markets”, Statement No. 13, Copenhagen, 4 February. 
Evans, Lewis and Patrick Hughes (2003) “Competition Policy in Small Distant Open 
Economies: Some Lessons from the Economics Literature” (NZISCR, Wellington). 
Goddard, David (1999), “Making Business Law: The CER Dimension”, Discussion Paper 
submitted to Ministry of Economic Development. 
Goddard, David and Kristie Drake (2001) “Securities Laws – key themes and recent 
developments”, Conference presentation. 
Guillen, M. (1999) “Corporate Governance and Globalization: Arguments and Evidence 
Against Convergence” Working Paper 99-11, The Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
Geiger, U. (1998) “Harmonisation of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market – 
A Proposal”, 66 Ford. L. Review 1785, 1800-1805. 
  22
   
Leebron, D.W. (1996) “Lying Down With Procustes: An Analysis of Harmonisation 
Claims” in J.N. Bhagwati and R.E. Hudev (eds.) Fair Trade and Harmonisation: 
Prerequisites for Free Trade?, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Lloyd, P.J. (1997) “Competition Policy in APEC: Principles of Harmonisation”, 
Department of Economics Research Paper No. 558, The University of Melbourne, 
March.  
Lloyd, P.J., and Associates (2001) “Harmonising Competition and Investment Policies in 
the East Asian Region”, Joint World Bank-Japan Study on East Asia’s Future Economy, 
Paper for the Third Asia Development Forum on “Regional Economic Cooperation in 
Asia and the Pacific”, Asian Development Bank, 11-14 June 2001, Bangkok. 
Niemeyer, J. (2001) “An Economic Analysis of Securities Market Regulation and 
Supervision: Where to Go after the Lamfalussy Report”, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series 
in Economics and Finance, No. 482, December 14.  
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1999) “OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance”, Paris. 
Romano, Roberta (2001) “The Need for Competition in International Securities 
Regulation”, Yale International Centre for Finance, Yale School of Management, June 
30. 
Shah, Ajay, and Susan Thomas (2001) “Securities market infrastructure for small 
countries”, Working Paper, October. 
Spier Consulting Pty Ltd (2002) Submission to the Trade Practices Act Review (Dawson 
Inquiry), July. 
Sykes, Alan O. (2000) “Regulatory Competition or Regulatory Harmonisation? A Silly 
Question?” Journal of International Economic Law, 257-264. 
The Committee of Wise Men (2001) “Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the 
Regulation of European Securities Markets” (Chairman: Alexandre Lamfalussy), 
Brussels, 15 February. 
The High Level Group of Company Law Experts (2002)  “Report of the High Level 
Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law 
in Europe”, Brussels, 4 November. 
Wilkinson, Bryce (2003) “Reform of Securities Trading Law – Evolution and Risks” 
(Wellington: Capital Economics). 
World Federation of Exchanges (2001) Annual Report. 
 
 
  23
   
